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In Defense of Weird Hypotheticals

orcid logo 16px Barbara A Spellman

Professor Allen (this issue) critiques the value of using “weird” hypotheticals to mine intuitions about legal systems. I respond by supporting the value of “thin” hypotheticals for providing information about how people reason generally, rather than for revealing peoples’ specific answers. I note that because legal systems are the products of many minds thinking about how other minds operate, the object of inquiry is metacognition—that is, understanding how reasoning works.
legal epistemology; reasoning; metacognition; psychology and law

Referencias

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ISSN-e: 2604-6202

ISSN: 2660-4515