In Defense of Weird Hypotheticals




Professor Allen (this issue) critiques the value of using “weird” hypotheticals to mine intuitions about legal systems. I respond by supporting the value of “thin” hypotheticals for providing information about how people reason generally, rather than for revealing peoples’ specific answers. I note that because legal systems are the products of many minds thinking about how other minds operate, the object of inquiry is metacognition—that is, understanding how reasoning works.

Palabras clave

legal epistemology, reasoning, metacognition, psychology and law


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Biografía del autor/a

Barbara A Spellman, University of Virginia School of Law

Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology




Cómo citar

Spellman, B. A. (2021). In Defense of Weird Hypotheticals. Quaestio Facti. Revista Internacional Sobre Razonamiento Probatorio, (2).