Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence
Methodological Reflections
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This paper discusses Ronald Allen’s article, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited, and reflects on how epistemology can contribute to our understanding of the evidentiary proof process. I first situate Allen’s critique of recent philosophical scholarship, distinguishing between general theoretical accounts of proof (including the theory that Allen and I have defended), on one hand, and the applications of specific epistemological concepts or issues to law, on the other. I then present a methodological picture that diverges in some respects from the one that emerges from Allen’s critique. In discussing this alternative methodological picture, I explain how epistemology can contribute to legal evidence and proof while avoiding the problems that Allen identifies.Palabras clave
Epistemology, legal proof, relative plausibility, statistical evidence, safety, sensitivityDescargas
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https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i2.22484Publicado
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Derechos de autor 2021 Michael S. Pardo
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.