La prueba predictiva en los procesos penales

¿Por qué el derecho penal debe tratar a las personas como si tuvieran libre albedrío impredecible?




En los procesos penales, a efectos de la determinación de si un individuo ejecutó una acción culpable, la prueba predictiva es usualmente ignorada. Por ejemplo, la elevada tasa de delitos que involucran armas de fuego ilegales en cierto vecindario no es usada en sustento de una condena en contra de una persona que allí reside por un delito que involucra un arma de fuego ilegal. Este artículo procura explicar y justificar la hostilidad del derecho penal hacia la prueba predictiva, sugiriendo que el derecho penal, en lo concerniente a la determinación de los hechos, se adhiere implícitamente a la visión según la cual la conducta culpable presupone un libre arbitrio necesariamente impredecible. Se argumenta luego que el derecho penal debe tratar a las personas sobre la base de la asunción de que ellas poseen libre albedrío impredecible, incluso en caso de que esta asunción carezca de fundamento o resulte falsa. El argumento procede mostrando cómo el uso de pruebas predictivas socava la efectividad del reproche. Se muestra también que esta justificación tiene una ventaja considerable frente a la justificación popular basada en los incentivos. 

Palabras clave

prueba estadística, relevancia, prueba, reproche, puenteo


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Biografía del autor/a

Amit Pundik, Tel Aviv University

Senior Lecturer in Law

The Buchmann Faculty of Law

Tel Aviv University




Cómo citar

Pundik, A. (2023). La prueba predictiva en los procesos penales: ¿Por qué el derecho penal debe tratar a las personas como si tuvieran libre albedrío impredecible?. Quaestio Facti. Revista Internacional Sobre Razonamiento Probatorio, (6), 11–47.