Testimonial Injustice in Evidential Reasoning

A Reply to Federico Picinali

Autores/as

  • Rachel Herdy Profesora Associada, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez

Resumen

This article critiques Federico Picinali’s theoretical framework for explaining how testimonial injustice impacts evidential reasoning. It argues that Picinali’s framework, though intended to be general, falls short in capturing various forms of testimonial injustice in the assessments of relevance and probative value. Two reasons are offered to support this conclusion. First, Picinali’s emphasis on the idea of stock of knowledge offers an intricate manifestation of the phenomenon, leaving aside cases of testimonial injustice <i>simpliciter</i>. Second, his framework overlooks instances of credibility excess and how epistemic harms that affect different agents may ricochet to the parties. It is argued that Picinali’s framework can be improved by adopting a description of testimonial injustice in the assessments of relevance and probative value that is less intricate and more relational.

Palabras clave

Testimonial Injustice, Hermeneutical Injustice, Credibility, Stock of Knowledge, evidencial law, intelligibility

Citas

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Cases and legislation

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DOI

https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i7.23031

Publicado

2024-06-03

Cómo citar

Herdy, R. (2024). Testimonial Injustice in Evidential Reasoning: A Reply to Federico Picinali. Quaestio Facti. Revista Internacional Sobre Razonamiento Probatorio, (7). https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i7.23031