Epistemic Injustice in the Criminal Trial
Engaging with Gonzales Rose, Herdy, Jalloh and Owusu-Bempah
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Jasmine Gonzales Rose, Rachel Herdy, Tareeq Jalloh and Abenaa Owusu-Bempah have each written a paper commenting on my essay ‘Evidential Reasoning, Testimonial Injustice and the Fairness of the Criminal Trial’, which appeared in Quaestio Facti in 2024. In this reply I engage with their insightful works. I discuss the advantages of framing in terms of ‘contributory injustice’ the scenarios analysed in my original essay. I briefly study the conditions for the existence of a correlation between credibility excess and credibility deficit. And I provide the sketch of a theory of trial fairness, which I am currently developing elsewhere.
Palabras clave
Probative value, Evidential reasoning, testimonial injustice, fairnessCitas
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Jalloh, T. (2024). Understanding Epistemic Injustice as Contributory Injustice: A Comment on Picinali’s Argument. Quaestio Facti, 7, 187-199. https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i7.23021
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Owusu-Bempah, A. (2024). Understanding and Preventing Testimonial Injustice in Criminal Proceedings: A Comment on Federico Picinali ‘Evidential Reasoning, Testimonial Injustice and the Fairness of the Criminal Trial’. Quaestio Facti, 7, 139-152. https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i7.23007
Picinali, F. (2024a). Evidential Reasoning, Testimonial Injustice and the Fairness of the Criminal Trial. Quaestio Facti, 6, 201-235. https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i6.22888
Picinali, F. (2024b). What is a Fair Criminal Trial? Unpublished Manuscript.
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https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i8.23098Publicado
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Derechos de autor 2025 Federico Picinali
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.