Taking the Evolution of the Standards of Proof for a Criminal Conviction Seriously

Autores/as

  • Jacopo Della Torre Università di Genova

Resumen

The article offers a diachronic and comparative analysis of different standards of proof for a criminal conviction. The first part focuses on the attempt of medieval and early modern Roman-canon systems to clarify this type of rule through a network of legal proofs. The second part analyses the origins of the main standards for a criminal conviction used today: moral certainty, beyond reasonable doubt and intime conviction. The final part looks to the future, asking whether traditional decision-making criteria should be maintained or replaced by new ones based on the principles of contemporary epistemology.

Palabras clave

standard of proof, reasonable doubt, moral certainty, intime conviction, Legal Proof

Citas

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DOI

https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i8.23112

Publicado

28-01-2025

Cómo citar

Jacopo Della Torre. (2025). Taking the Evolution of the Standards of Proof for a Criminal Conviction Seriously. Quaestio Facti. Revista Internacional Sobre Razonamiento Probatorio, (8). https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i8.23112