The Content of Legal Evidence

Autores/as

Descargas

Resumen

The boundary between old evidence and new evidence depends on how the content of evidence should be individuated. The paper explores conflicting pressures on the standard of individuation. Computational considerations and Frege cases of unknown co-reference both favour fine-grained individuation. The mathematical structure of probability theory, intensional and direct reference semantics, differences in format between verbal and perceptual evidence, the need for evidence to be transmitted from one context to another in memory and testimony, and the publicity of legal evidence all favour coarse-grained individuation. The paper argues that coarse-grained individuation is theoretically better motivated, and that pressures towards fine-grained individuation can be understood as resulting from our reliance on efficient but fallible disquotational heuristics for the ascription of agents’ relations to propositions on the basis of their interactions with sentences expressing those propositions. Coarse-grained models can still be adapted ad hoc to understand more fine-grained phenomena.

Palabras clave

Evidence, Probability, Form, Content, Intensionalism

Descargas

Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.

Citas

Braun, D. (2016). The objects of belief and credence. Mind, 125, p. 469-497. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv137

Builes, D. (2020). A paradox of evidential equivalence. Mind, 129, p. 113-127. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz046

Gigerenzer, G., Hertwig, R., and Pachur, T. (eds.) (2011). The Foundations of Adaptive Behaviour. Oxford University Press.

Grimmett, R., and Stirzaker, D. (2001). Probability and Random Processes (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky., A. (eds.) (1982). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.

Kripke, S. (1979). A puzzle about belief. In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use (p. 239-283). Reidel.

Mahtani, A. (2017). The ex ante Pareto Principle. Journal of Philosophy, 114, p. 303-323. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2017114622

Mahtani, A. (2021). Frege’s puzzle and the ex ante Pareto Principle. Philosophical Studies, 178, p. 2077-2100. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01524-w

Mahtani, A. (2023). The Objects of Credence. Oxford University Press.

Peer, E., and Gamliel, E. (2013). Heuristics and biases in judicial decisions. Court Review: The Journal of the American Judges Association, 49, p. 114-118. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1428&context=ajacourtreview

Stalnaker, R. (1999). Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford University Press.

Weisberg, M. (2013). Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World. Oxford University Press.

Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.

Williamson, T. (2021). Epistemological consequences of Frege puzzles. Philosophical Topics, 49, p. 287-319. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202149226

Williamson, T. (2024). Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i9.23125

Publicado

29-06-2025

Cómo citar

Williamson, T. (2025). The Content of Legal Evidence. Quaestio Facti. Revista Internacional Sobre Razonamiento Probatorio, (9). https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i9.23125