Bayesian Decision Theory Can Guide Legal Factfinding
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Resumen
I argue that Bayesian decision theory can guide legal factfinding. I do so by offering an account of legal proof on which judges should minimize expected justice costs. My account entails a judge’s credence threshold for finding guilty and his prior credence of guilt. Hence, it can guide a judge in his decision based on the lawful evidence presented at trial—unlike the Bayesian model Mackor presents.
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Legal Proof, Bayesianism, Decision Theory, Retributive Justice, Undeserved Punishment, Philosophy of LawDescargas
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https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i11.23280Publicado
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Derechos de autor 2026 Mario Günther
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.