Accuracy and fairness – Siamese twins?
A Comment on Sarah Summers «Epistemic Ambitions of the Criminal Trial: Truth, Proof and Rights»
Resumen
The author agrees with Sarah Summers’ view that a criminal judgment in a system of fair justice should be substantively accurate and at the same time should be the result of a fair process. The author argues, however, for keeping these two requirements apart because they are linked to different goals and may in individual cases conflict with each other.
Citas
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Summers, S. J. (2023). The Epistemic Ambitions of the Criminal Trial: Truth, Proof, and Rights. Quaestio facti: revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio, 4, p. 249-272.
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Weigend, Th. (2014). Assuming that the Defendant is not Guilty: The Presumption of Innocence in the German System of Criminal Justice. Criminal Law and Philosophy, 8, p. 285-299.
Weigend, Th. (2018). Zur Reichweite der Unschuldsvermutung. In U. Stein et al. (eds), Systematik in Strafrechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung. Festschrift für Klaus Rogall zum 70. Geburtstag (p. 739-755). Duncker & Humblot.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i5.22844Publicado
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Derechos de autor 2023 Thomas Weigend
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.