How to Theorize about Statistical Evidence (and Really, about Everything Else)
A comment on Allen
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Abstract
In responding to Prof. Allen's paper, I make several general methodological points: about the use of hypothetical cases, about the point of theorizing, and about the role of idealization. Then I make some more specific points about his claims about (and against) previous work on statistical evidence.Keywords
legal epistemology, statistical evidence, legal theoryReferences
Enoch, D. (2012). Comment on Yaffe’s Attempts. Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, 6, p. 20 – 35.
Enoch, D. (2018). Against Utopianism: Noncompliance and Multiple Agents. Philosophers’ Imprint, 18.
Enoch, D., Spectre, L. and Fisher, T. (2012). Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 40, p. 197-224.
Enoch, D. and Fisher, T. (2015) Sense and Sensitivity: Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence. Stanford Law Review, 67, p. 557 – 611.
Enoch, D. and Spectre, L. (2019). Sensitivity, Safety, and the Law: A Reply to Pardo. Legal Theory, 25, p. 178-199.
Enoch, D., Fisher, T. and Spectre, L. (2021). Does Legal Epistemology Rest on a Mistake? On Fetishism, System Design, and Conscientious Fact-Finding. Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper, 21-22
Machery, E., Stich, S., Rose, D., Chatterjee, A., Karasawa, K., Struchiner, N., Sirker, S., Usui, N. & Hashimoto, T. (2015). Gettier across Cultures. Nous, 51, p. 645-664.
Nagel, J. (2012). Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85, p. 495-527.
Pinillos, N. A., Jaramillo, S. & Horne, Z. (2019). Asymmetric belief sensitivity and justification explains the Wells Effect. Proceedings of the 41st Annual Cognitive Science Society.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i2.22455Published
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Copyright (c) 2020 David Enoch
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.