What’s so Special about the Criminal Trial?

A Comment on Sarah Summers «Epistemic Ambitions of the Criminal Trial: Truth, Proof, and Rights»

Autores/as

  • R A Duff University of Stirling

Resumen

This paper offers some further support to Sarah Summers’ argument, in «The Epistemic Ambitions of the Criminal Trial: Truth, Proof, and Rights», that we cannot separate process from outcome in the criminal trial—that the justification and legitimacy of the verdict (especially of a conviction) depends crucially on the procedure through which it was reached. Intuitive support for this view is found by considering the case of a guilty person who is convicted after a trial that denied him the opportunity or means for «effective participation»; further support is found in the provisions made for those who are «unfit to plead», those who lack the capacities necessary for effective participation in their trial. A firmer grounding for this view is then found in a theory of the criminal trial as a process through which alleged public wrongdoers are called to account—a process in which they should be active participants.

Palabras clave

Criminal trials, process and outcome, fitness to plead, calling to account

Citas

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Cases and legislation

Bail Act 1976. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1976/63/contents

European Convention on Human Rights (1950). Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. https://echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf

Ford v Wainwright 477 U.S. 399 (1986).

German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung – StPO)

Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/43

Mental Health Act 1983. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/20/contents

R v Galbraith (1981) 1 WLR 1039

R v Jones (Anthony) (2003) 1 AC

SC v UK (2005) 40 EHRR 10

Stanford v UK (1994) 2 WLUK 324

T v UK (2000) 30 EHRR 121

Biografía del autor/a

R A Duff, University of Stirling

Professor Emeritus of Philosophy

DOI

https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i5.22823

Publicado

2023-03-27

Cómo citar

Duff, R. A. (2023). What’s so Special about the Criminal Trial? A Comment on Sarah Summers «Epistemic Ambitions of the Criminal Trial: Truth, Proof, and Rights». Quaestio Facti. Revista Internacional Sobre Razonamiento Probatorio, (5), 159–168. https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i5.22823