Could Robot Judges Believe? Epistemic Ambitions of the Criminal Trial as we approach the Digital Age

A Comment on Sarah Summers «Epistemic Ambitions of the Criminal Trial: Truth, Proof, and Rights»

Autores/as

Resumen

Criminal proof is unique, in that it must be able to account for the justification of both: accurate fact-finding and a fair trial. This is Sarah Summers’ main message in her article on the epistemic ambitions of the criminal trial, which focusses on belief as a sort of proxy for societal acceptance of truth as a set of facts established by compliance to procedural rules. This commentary tests her finding by scrutinizing whether it is conceivable that robots, complying to all rules, assist in fact-finding with a specific form of legal belief based on a sophisticated probability weighting opaque to humans. The result is in accordance with Sarah Summers: as long as robots cannot explain their beliefs, any criminal proof based on them flounders as it can neither be part of a fair trial nor ensure acceptance in the existing institutional framework.

Palabras clave

Criminal Proof, Robot Judges, Legal Belief, Participation Rights in Criminal Trials, Evidence Law, Electronic Monk

Citas

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Cases and legislation

Ajdarić v Croatia, nº 20883/09, 13 December 2011.

Anđelković v Serbia, nº 1401/08, 9 April 2013.

Berhani v Albania, nº 847/05, 27 May 2010.

Khamidov v Russia, nº 72118/01, 15 November 2007.

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Biografía del autor/a

Sabine Gless, University of Basel

Juristische Fakultät der Universität Basel 

DOI

https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i5.22849

Publicado

13-03-2023

Cómo citar

Gless, S. (2023). Could Robot Judges Believe? Epistemic Ambitions of the Criminal Trial as we approach the Digital Age: A Comment on Sarah Summers «Epistemic Ambitions of the Criminal Trial: Truth, Proof, and Rights». Quaestio Facti. Revista Internacional Sobre Razonamiento Probatorio, (5), 169–179. https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i5.22849