Understanding Epistemic Injustice as Contributory Injustice

A Comment on Picinali's Argument

Autores/as

  • Tareeq Jalloh University of Sheffield

Resumen

This paper offers some further support to Federico Picinali’s argument, in «Evidential Reasoning, Testimonial Injustice and the Fairness of the Criminal Trial», that a trial is unfair when assessments of relevance and probative value includes an epistemic injustice, namely a testimonial injustice. It has been argued that there are barriers to establishing testimonial injustice in specific cases, such as the ones Picinali surveys. This paper argues that even if we accept that there are concerns about establishing the occurrence of a testimonial injustice in the cases Picinali identifies, we can reformulate the epistemic injustice that renders the trial unfair as a contributory injustice. Reformulating the epistemic injustice as a contributory injustice evades the concerns we might have with establishing testimonial injustice allowing Picinali’s broad argument that a trial is unfair when an assessment of evidence includes an epistemic injustice—contributory or testimonial—to remain intact. This reformulation also offers new propositions on how to combat epistemic injustice.

Palabras clave

criminal proceedings, trial fairness, rap music, contributory injustice, preventing epistemic injustice

Citas

Arcila-Valenzuela, M. and Páez, A. (2022). Testimonial Injustice: The Facts of the Matter. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1-18.

Art Not Evidence (2023, November 22). https://artnotevidence.org/

Art on Trial: Protect Black Art (2022, November 1). https://www.protectblackart.co/

Berger, J. (2020). Implicit Attitudes and Awareness. Synthese, 197, 1291-1312.

Dotson, K. (2012). A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression. Frontiers. A Journal of Women Studies, 33(1), 24-47.

Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.

Hahn, A., Judd, C. M., Hirsh, H. K. and Blair, I. V. (2014). Awareness of Implicit Attitudes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(3), 1369-1392.

Jalloh, T. (2022). Does the Critical Scrutiny of Drill Constitute an Epistemic Injustice. The British Journal of Aesthetics, 62(4), 633-651.

Lammy, D. (2017). The Lammy Review. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a82009040f0b-62305b91f49/lammy-review-final-report.pdf

Ortega, M. (2006). Being Lovingly, Knowingly Ignorant: White Feminism and Women of Colour. Hypatia, 21(3), 56-74.

Owusu-Bempah, A. (2022). Prosecuting Rap: What Does the Case Law Tell Us. Journal of Popular Music, 41(1), 427-455.

Picinali, F. (2024). Evidential Reasoning, Testimonial Injustice and the Fairness of the Criminal Trial. Quaestio Facti, 6, 201-236.

Cases and Legislation

Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/23/contents

DOI

https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i7.23021

Publicado

2024-06-29

Cómo citar

Jalloh, T. (2024). Understanding Epistemic Injustice as Contributory Injustice: A Comment on Picinali’s Argument. Quaestio Facti. Revista Internacional Sobre Razonamiento Probatorio, (7), 187–199. https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i7.23021