Legal Epistemology and Legal Proof
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Abstract
Este artículo examina la relación entre la epistemología jurídica y la prueba jurídica. Por un lado, en los últimos años se ha producido una auténtica explosión de trabajos que aplican ideas, conceptos y argumentos filosóficos procedentes de la epistemología al derecho de la prueba y al proceso de acreditación de los hechos en contextos jurídicos. Por otro lado, se han desarrollado debates teóricos continuos sobre el propio derecho, centrados en cuál es la mejor manera de entender el proceso probatorio y sus componentes (incluido el derecho probatorio). Se trata de proyectos teóricos distintos, pero relacionados.
El artículo comienza presentando un esquema del funcionamiento de la prueba jurídica en Estados Unidos. El análisis se centra en aspectos del proceso probatorio que hasta ahora han sido relativamente desatendidos en la epistemología jurídica. Entre estos aspectos se incluyen la estructura explicativa del proceso probatorio, el papel de las partes en el sistema adversarial y la forma en que los tribunales valoran la suficiencia de la prueba. A la luz de este esquema de la prueba jurídica, el artículo examina la epistemología jurídica del filósofo Larry Laudan. De este examen surgen varias lecciones y también una serie de limitaciones en lo que respecta a la aplicación de la epistemología al derecho de la prueba y a la prueba jurídica. Por último, el artículo aplica estas lecciones y limitaciones a otras cuestiones tratadas recientemente en la epistemología jurídica, entre las que destacan: la prueba estadística, el estándar de la “preponderancia de la prueba”, la seguridad epistémica, el conocimiento y la injusticia epistémica.
Parole chiave
prueba jurídica, estándares de prueba, suficiencia de la prueba, valor probatorio, epstemología jurídica, Larry Laudan, aignación de errores, reducción de errores, prueba estadística, preponderancia de la prueba, seguridad epistémica, conocimiento, injusticia epistémica, inferencia a la mejor explicaciónDownloads
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DOI
https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i10.23222Pubblicato
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