Strong, Weak, or Apparent Naturalization? Relative Plausibility Theory and Conceptual Analysis
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Resumo
This article focuses on the adoption of naturalized epistemology as a framework for the relative plausibility theory developed by Ron Allen. It questions both the distinctness of Allen’s way of theorizing from a common version of conceptual analysis and the compliance of relative plausibility theory with the “naturalistic” methodological requirement expressed by the “Results Continuity” thesis.
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naturalized epistemology, conceptual analysis, relative plausibility theory, jurisprudence, methodologyDownloads
Referências
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DOI
https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i2.22465Publicado
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Copyright (c) 2021 Nicola Muffato
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.