Epistemic Justification, Robust Evidentialism, Legal Proof
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Abstract
My purpose in this essay is twofold: 1) to introduce and elaborate on a debate originated within the province of evidentialism in epistemology (leading to «robust» versions of evidentialism) that has not received much attention from the rationalist approach to legal evidence and proof, and 2) to sketch the contours of a conception of legal evidence and proof that emerges from that debate, which is to a certain extent alternative but nonetheless rationalist too. This conception is comprised of an aretaic component (which refers to certain epistemic virtues), an argumentative understanding of legal evidence and proof, and a particular analysis of the force and sense or meaning of the so-called evidentiary statements of the form «it is proven that “p”».
Keywords
epistemic justification, evidentialism, legal evidence and proof, rationalist tradition, standards of proofReferences
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DOI
https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i3.22733Published
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Copyright (c) 2022 Edgar Ramón Aguilera García
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.