La Negligencia institucional frente al riesgo epistémico de los sesgos cognitivos en el derecho
Abstract
El riesgo epistémico en el derecho es la posibilidad de cometer errores o aceptar conclusiones falsas debido a la incertidumbre fáctica y a los valores no epistémicos que rodean la toma de decisiones. Uno de los factores que contribuye a la distorsión de las decisiones en todos los momentos procesales es la influencia innegable de los sesgos cognitivos. En este artículo explico cómo estos contribuyen a aumentar el riesgo epistémico y exploro las posibles razones por las que los sistemas judiciales no han tomado medidas significativas para eliminar esta fuente de error. Al final analizo el problema de cómo atribuir responsabilidades a los diferentes agentes que integran el sistema judicial ante una actitud que solo puede ser catalogada como negligencia epistémica.
Parole chiave
Riesgos epistémicos, sesgos cognitivos, responsabilidad colectiva, responsabilidad institucional, negligencia epistémicaDownloads
Riferimenti bibliografici
Arcila-Valenzuela, M., & Páez, A. (2024). Testimonial injustice: The facts of the matter. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 15(2), 585-602.
Arena, F. (2021), Responsabilidad por sesgos implícitos y decisión judicial. En F. Carbonell & J. Valenzuela (Eds.), Fundamentos filosóficos del derecho procesal (pp. 47-80). Tirant Lo Blanch.
Atienza, M. (1991). Las razones del derecho. Teorías de la argumentación jurídica. Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
Austin, W., & Williams III, T. A. (1977). A survey of judges’ responses to simulated legal cases: Research note on sentencing disparity. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 68(2), 306-310.
Biddle, J. B. (2007). Lessons from the Vioxx debacle: what the privatization of science can teach us about social epistemology. Social Epistemology, 21(1), 21– 39.
Biddle, J. B., & Kukla, R. (2017). The geography of epistemic risk. En K. C. Elliott & T. Richards (Eds.), Exploring inductive risk: Case studies of values in science (pp. 215-237). Oxford University Press.
Bordalo, P., Coffman, K., Gennaioli, N., & Shleifer, A. (2016). Stereotypes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4), 1753-1794.
Brownstein, M. (2018). The implicit mind: Cognitive architecture, the self, and ethics. Oxford University Press.
Brownstein, M., & Saul, J. (Eds.). (2016a). Implicit bias and philosophy, volume 1: Metaphysics and epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Brownstein, M., & Saul, J. (Eds.). (2016b). Implicit bias and philosophy, volume 2: Moral responsibility, structural injustice, and ethics. Oxford University Press.
Buller, D. B., & Burgoon, J. K. (1996). Interpersonal deception theory. Communication Theory, 6(3), 203–242.
Clancy, K., Bartolomeo, J., Richardson, D., & Wellford, C. (1981). Sentence decisionmaking: The logic of sentence decisions and the extent and sources of sentence disparity. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 72(2), 524-554.
Collins, A. W. (1996). Moore’s Paradox and epistemic risk. Philosophical Quarterly, 46(148), 308–319.
Coloma, R., Larroucau, J., & Páez, A. (2024). Sobre el impacto judicial de la concepción racionalista de la prueba. Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law, 53. DOI: 10.4000/123oc.
Darley, J. M., & Latané, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: diffusion of responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8(4), 377–383.
Douglas, H. (2000). Inductive risk and values in science. Philosophy of Science, 67(4), 559-579.
Douglas, H. (2017). Why inductive risk requires values in science. En K. C. Elliott & D. Steel (Eds.), Current controversies in values and science (pp. 81-93). Routledge.
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1978). Fault trees: Sensitivity of estimated failure probabilities to problem representation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 4, 330-344.
Fleisher, W., & Šešelja, D. (2020). Collective epistemic responsibility: a preventionist account. https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/17003/.
Frankel, M. E. (1973). Criminal sentences: Law without order. Hill and Wang.
Fricker, M. (2016). Fault and no-fault responsibility for implicit prejudice: A space for epistemic ‘agent-regret’. En M. S. Brady & M. Fricker (Eds.), The epistemic life of groups (pp. 33-50). Oxford University Press.
Gigerenzer, G. (2006). Heuristics. En G. Gigerenzer & C. Engel (Eds.), Heuristics and the law (pp. 17-44). MIT Press.
Gillis, N. B. (2021). Sexism in the judiciary: The importance of bias definition in NLP and in our courts. En Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Gender Bias in Natural Language Processing (pp. 45-54). ACM.
Haslanger, S. (2015), Distinguished lecture: Social structure, narrative, and explanation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 45(1), 1-15.
Hempel, C. G. (1965). Science and human values. En Aspects of scientific explanation (pp. 81-96). The Free Press.
Hindriks, F. (2019). The duty to join forces: When individuals lack control. The Monist, 102(2), 204-220.
Hirsch, A. J. (2004). Evolutionary theories of common law efficiency: Reasons for (cognitive) skepticism. Florida. State University Law Review, 32(2), 425-441.
Holroyd, J. (2012). Responsibility for Implicit Bias. Journal of Social Philosophy, 43(3), 274-306.
Holroyd, J., Scaife, R., & Stafford, T. (2017). Responsibility for implicit bias. Philosophy Compass, 12(3), e12410.
Jois, G. U. (2009). Stare decisis is cognitive error. Brooklyn Law Review, 75(1), 63-141.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., y Tversky, A (Eds.) (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge University Press.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80, 237-251.
Kuran, T., & Sunstein, C. R. (1998). Availability cascades and risk regulation. Stanford Law Review, 51, 683-768.
Latané, B., & Darley, J. M. (1968). Group inhibition of bystander intervention in emergencies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10(3), 215–221.
Laudan, L. (2006). Truth, error, and criminal law: an essay in legal epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (2003). Bridging individual, interpersonal, and institutional approaches to judgment and decision making: The impact of accountability on cognitive bias. En S. L. Schneider & J. Shanteau (Eds.), Emerging perspectives on judgment and decision research (pp. 431–457). Cambridge University Press.
Lidén, M. (2023). Confirmation bias in criminal cases. Oxford University Press.
Marshall, B. C., & Alison, L. J. (2007). Stereotyping, congruence and presentation order: Interpretative biases in utilizing offender profiles. Psychology, Crime & Law, 13(3), 285-303.
Miller, N., & Campbell, D. T. (1959). Recency and primacy in persuasion as a function of the timing of speeches and measurements. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59(1), 1-9.
Monahan, J., & Walker, L. (1988). Social science research in law: A new paradigm. American Psychologist, 43, 465-472.
Myers, D. G., & Lamm, H. (1976). The group polarization phenomenon. Psychological Bulletin, 83, 602–627.
Neal, T. M., Slobogin, C., Saks, M. J., Faigman, D. L., & Geisinger, K. F. (2019). Psychological assessments in legal contexts: Are courts keeping “junk science” out of the courtroom?. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 20(3), 135-164.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). The halo effect: Evidence for unconscious alteration of judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35(4), 250-256.
O'Brien, B., & Grosso, C. M. (2020). Criminal trials and reforms intended to reduce the impact of race: A review. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 16(1), 117-130.
Páez, A. (2021). Los sesgos cognitivos y la legitimidad racional de las decisiones judiciales. En F. J. Arena, P. Luque, & D. Moreno Cruz (Eds.), Razonamiento jurídico y ciencias cognitivas (pp. 187-222). Universidad Externado de Colombia.
Páez, A., & Matida, J. (2023). La injusticia epistémica en el proceso penal. Milan Law Review, 4(2), 114-136.
Partridge, A., & Eldridge, W. B. (1974). The Second Circuit sentencing study: A report to the judges of the Second Circuit. Federal Judicial Center.
Posner, R. A. (1999). An economic approach to the law of evidence. Stanford Law Review, 51, 1477-1546.
Rachlinski, J. J. (1998). A positive psychological theory of judging in hindsight. The University of Chicago Law Review, 65, 571-625.
Rasmussen, N. (1975). Reactor safety study. WASH-1400. US NRC.
Rodríguez, H. A. (2024). Sesgos implícitos, injusticia explícita: Efectos epistémicos de los sesgos inconscientes en el razonamiento probatorio en México. Quaestio Facti, 7, 103–135.
Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. En L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Vol. 10 (pp. 173–220). Academic Press.
Saks, M. J., & Kidd, R. F. (1980). Human information processing and adjudication: Trial by heuristics. Law and Society Revi¬¬ew, 15, 123-160.
Saks, M. J., & Baron, C. H. (Eds.) (1980). The use/nonuse/misuse of applied social research in the courts. Abt Books.
Schauer, F. (2006). On the supposed jury-dependence of evidence law. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 155, 165-202.
Schwenkenbecher, A. (2021). Structural injustice and massively shared obligations. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 38(1), 23-39.
Small, M. A. (1993). Legal psychology and therapeutic jurisprudence. St. Louis University Law Review, 37, 675-713.
Toribio, J. (2022). Responsibility for implicitly biased behavior: A habit-based approach. Journal of Social Philosophy, 53(2), 239-254.
Tuerkheimer, D. (2017). Incredible women: Sexual violence and the credibility discount. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 166(1), 1-58.
Weinstein, I. (2003). Don’t believe everything you think: Cognitive bias in legal decision making. Clinical Law Review, 9, 783-834.
Wellborn III, O. G. (1991). Demeanor. Cornell Law Review, 76(5), 1075-1105.
Wilholt, T. (2009). Bias and values in scientific research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, 40(1), 92– 101.
Pubblicato
Come citare
Fascicolo
Sezione
Licenza
Copyright (c) 2025 Andrés Páez
TQuesto lavoro è fornito con la licenza Creative Commons Attribuzione 4.0 Internazionale.