La Negligencia institucional frente al riesgo epistémico de los sesgos cognitivos en el derecho
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Resumo
El riesgo epistémico en el derecho es la posibilidad de cometer errores o aceptar conclusiones falsas debido a la incertidumbre fáctica y a los valores no epistémicos que rodean la toma de decisiones. Uno de los factores que contribuye a la distorsión de las decisiones en todos los momentos procesales es la influencia innegable de los sesgos cognitivos. En este artículo explico cómo estos contribuyen a aumentar el riesgo epistémico y exploro las posibles razones por las que los sistemas judiciales no han tomado medidas significativas para eliminar esta fuente de error. Al final analizo el problema de cómo atribuir responsabilidades a los diferentes agentes que integran el sistema judicial ante una actitud que solo puede ser catalogada como negligencia epistémica.
Palavras-chave
riesgos epistémicos, sesgos cognitivos, responsabilidad colectiva, responsabilidad institucional, negligencia epistémicaDownloads
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DOI
https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i10.23123Publicado
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